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Abstract
The WTO’s Appellate Body (AB) dealt with a number of issues for the first time in this
report. Importantly, it discussed the consistency of the European Union (EU) regulation with
the multilateral rules on the conditions for deviating from the obligation to calculate
individual dumping margins. Although China formally won the argument, the AB may have
opened the door to treat China as a non-market economy (NME) even beyond 2016 when
China’s NME-status was thought to expire under the terms of China’s 2001 WTO Accession
Protocol. The AB further dealt with numerous other issues ranging from statistical sampling
to the treatment of confidential information. In handling its investigation, the EU authorities
made a number of questionable decisions regarding the collection of information, and this
aspect of the process was central to China’s legal challenges.
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1

The Legal Facts

China complained against an imposition of antidumping (AD) duties by the European
Union (EU)1 concerning various classes of fasteners. China advanced a series of claims
before the Panel and prevailed in the most significant ones: chief among them the claim
that China’s treatment as a non-market economy (NME) entailed specific consequences,
and did not amount to a licence to impose AD duties on presumptions rather than on hard
facts.

The Panel had found that the EU had violated its obligations under Arts. 6.10 and 9.5 AD by
imposing country-wide AD duties against Chinese exporters solely because China was
considered to be a NME; in particular, the Panel found that specific provisions of the EU
legislation2 (the Market Economy Test, MET, and the Individual treatment, IT) were in
violation of the above mentioned provisions. Importantly, the Panel found that the EU
measure was at odds with the AD Agreement both ‘as such’ (that is, irrespective of its
application in particular cases) and ‘as applied’ in the present dispute.

Here is how the EU system works: the EU will subject all imports from NMEs to country
wide dumping margins, except for the following instances (quoted from §§ 7.49-50 of the
Panel report):

7.49.

Article 9(5) provides for an exception to the specification of a country-wide duty
rate. It provides:

1Throughout

this paper we use the acronym EU to refer to the defendant. In fact, this acronym has already
substituted the term EC (European Community) in the WTO glossary. The official name of the report we
discuss here is of course EC-Fasteners since the Panel had been established before the Treaty of Lisbon that
provoked the change from EC to EU entered into force.
2Council

Regulation (EC) 1225/2009 (hereinafter the EU Regulation).

1
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"Where Article 2(7)(a) applies, an individual duty shall, however, be
specified for the exporters which can demonstrate, on the basis of properly
substantiated claims that:
"(a)
in the case of wholly or partly foreign owned firms or joint ventures,
exporters are free to repatriate capital and profits;
(b)
export prices and quantities, and conditions and terms of sale are
freely determined;
(c)
the majority of the shares belong to private persons; state officials
appearing on the board of directors or holding key management positions
shall either be in minority or it must be demonstrated that the company is
nonetheless sufficiently independent from State interference;
(d)

exchange rate conversions are carried out at the market rate; and

(e)
State interference is not such as to permit circumvention of
measures if individual exporters are given different rates of duty."
These criteria are generally referred to as the "individual treatment ("IT")" test. If a
producer demonstrates that it meets these conditions and is thus entitled to IT, the EU
authorities will specify an individual duty rate for that producer. Exporters who do not
satisfy the IT test will be subject to the country-wide duty rate.

7.50 In sum, when an exporter from a WTO Member that the European Union treats as a
NME is subject to an anti-dumping investigation conducted by the European Union, the
following possibilities with respect to the determination of normal value and the
imposition of duty apply:
(a)

If the exporter satisfies the MET, then its normal value will be determined on
the same basis as for producers in market economies. A dumping margin for
that producer will be calculated by comparing that normal value to the
export prices of that producer, and an individual duty rate will be applied to
that producer.

(b)

If the exporter fails the MET ("NME exporter"), then its normal value will be
determined on the basis of an alternative method (typically based on prices
in an analogue third country). Whether the export price used in calculating
the dumping margin will be based on the exporter's own export sales will
depend on whether the exporter requests and is granted IT.
(i)

If the NME exporter makes such a request and demonstrates that it
meets the criteria in Article 9(5) of the Basic AD Regulation, the NME
exporter will have an individual duty rate applied to it, calculated on
the basis of a comparison of the alternative-method normal value
with its own export prices.
2

Otherwise, the non-IT NME exporter will be subject to a country-wide duty rate. The
determination of the export price used to calculate that country-wide duty rate will depend
on the level of cooperation on the part of the non-IT exporters altogether. If the level of
cooperation is high, i.e. if the cooperating non-IT exporters account for close to 100 percent
of all exports, the export price will be based on a weighted average of the actual price of all
export transactions effected by these exporters. If, however, the level of cooperation is low,
i.e. if the non-IT exporters account for significantly less than 100 percent of all exports, the
Commission will resort to facts available to complete the missing information.

The

selection of the facts available will depend on the gravity of non-cooperation and may
include statistical import data.

The Panel found that the EU measure was inconsistent with the EU obligations under Art. I
GATT, since the EU was treating imports from NMEs worse than imports of like products
from market economies.

The Panel upheld China’s claims to the effect that the EU measure constituted a violation of
Art. 6.2 AD, and 6.4 AD since the EU based its decision to impose AD duties on facts other
than those that it had requested the Chinese exporters to provide. It finally found that the
EU had violated its obligations regarding treatment of confidential information since it
accepted that the entities supplying similar information did not have to also provide a nonconfidential summary. The Panel rejected the Chinese claims regarding the consistency of
the EU practices with Art. 2.4 AD which requests from WTO Members to perform a fair
comparison between normal value (NV) and EP. It decided to exercise judicial economy
and not rule on claims regarding the consistency of the EU measure with Arts. 9.3 and 9.4
AD, as well as with Art. X.3 GATT.
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The parties to the dispute challenged all findings mentioned supra, and the Appellate Body
(AB) had its hands full yet again in the context of a dispute coming under the purview of
the AD Agreement.3

Section 2 provides a brief background of the economic markets involved in this case and a
related antidumping investigation and WTO dispute. In Section 3, we briefly discuss the
appealed issues and in the immediately following Section 4 we present in detail the
findings of the AB on each one of them. Section 5 contains our analytical assessment of
some of the key areas of the AB report in which the issue of statistical sampling arose.
Section 6 concludes.

2

The Economic Facts and Markets Involved

This section briefly describes some of the underlying economic features of the traded
products subject to the antidumping measure, WTO dispute, and related policies – all based
on publicly available data.

2.1

The EU import market for steel fasteners

In November 2007, the European Union initiated an antidumping investigation into
imports of certain steel fasteners from China. A fastener is a hardware device that joins two
or more objects together. The EU’s preliminary investigation was completed in August

3WTO

Members typically raise the highest number of claims per dispute when litigating the consistency of
contingent protection instruments, see Horn et al. (2011), and also www.worldbank.org/trade/wtodisputes
The World Bank’s Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown, 2012) contains detailed data on most WTO
members’ use of antidumping, safeguards and countervailing duties and is available at
http://econ.worldbank.org/ttbd/ .
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2008 without imposition of preliminary measures. The final determination resulted in the
imposition of antidumping measures in January of 2009.

Table 1 summarizes some of the key features of the EU steel fasteners import market and
policies that affect its imports of those products. The EU’s applied MFN tariff on steel
fastener imports was 3.7 percent, a rate identical to its WTO binding. Domestic petitioners
in the European Union’s steel fasteners antidumping investigation were represented by the
European Industrial Fasteners Institute (EIFI). While the actual number and identity of
firms behind the EIFI petition are unknown, in terms of geographic distribution of reported
production in the EU’s official antidumping announcement, the EU reported verifying the
surveyed domestic producer information of five firms from Italy, one from Poland, and one
from Sweden – firms allegedly chosen in part because they represented a large percentage
of total community-wide domestic production.4

Of the more than 110 Chinese exporting firms that responded to the EU investigation, eight
received individual treatment and firm-specific antidumping measures. The result of the
investigation led to two of these firms not facing any antidumping measures, whereas the
other six firms faced duties ranging from 26.5 percent to 79.5 percent. One of the Chinese
firms facing a zero rate, Yantai Agrati Fasteners Co. Ltd, was the Chinese subsidiary of one
of the EU’s surveyed domestic producers headquartered in Italy (Agrati SpA). The other
Chinese firm facing a zero rate, Celo Suzhou Precision Fasteners Co. Ltd, was the Chinese
subsidiary of Grupo Celo, a Spanish-headquartered company that was not involved in the
public report. For more than 100 other Chinese exporters that the EU deemed to have
cooperated with the investigation, they faced a common country-wide rate of 77.5 percent,
and the all other (noncooperating) firms faced a rate of 85.0 percent.
These firms were Agrati SpA (Italy), Finnveden Bulten (Sweden), Fontana Luigi SpA and LOBO SpA (Italy),
Growermetal Srl (Italy), Invitea SpA (Italy), Societa Bulloneria Europea SpA (Italy), and Srubex Fabryca
Lancut SA (Poland).
4
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According to trade data that is publicly available at the tariff line level, the EU steel
fasteners market for the product ultimately subject to its antidumping measures peaked at
$2.1 billion in extra-EU imports in 2008, having doubled from its 2005 level. As Figure 1a
illustrates, more than half of the growth in EU imports of this product during this period
came from China alone. EU steel fastener imports from China peaked at $1.1 billion in 2008,
having risen steadily from $100 million less than a decade earlier. China’s exports of this
product to the EU dropped off considerably after imposition of the antidumping measure,
falling by more than $1 billion to $82 million by 2010.

Figure 1b illustrates China’s share of the EU import market for these products had risen to
more than 70 percent by 2008, falling off to only 7 percent by 2010 after imposition of the
measure. Other major foreign suppliers of the EU market for these particular products
included Taiwan, China and the United States – indeed, most of the EU import market share
vacated by China due to imposed antidumping measure was reallocated toward imports
from Taiwan, China – from 21 percent in 2008 to 53 percent in 2010. Nevertheless, a
combination of the antidumping measure on China and weak overall EU import demand
associated with the Great Recession and the lingering European debt crisis has resulted in
the total volume of EU imports of steel fasteners dropping off considerably. While not
shown in the figures, the data indicate that by 2010 total EU import volumes were only 40
percent of their peak level reached in 2007.5 The value of total EU steel fastener imports of
$1.1 billion in 2010 was also back to its 2005 level, 54 percent of its peak level reached in
2008.

5According

to the 8-digit tariff line Eurostat import data, extra-EU total imports of the steel fasteners at issue
in the antidumping investigation totalled 904 thousand tonnes in 2007 and fell to 351 thousand tonnes in
2010.
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Finally, it is also noteworthy that in October 2010, the EU began an anti-circumvention
investigation examining allegations that the Chinese exporters subject to the EU
antidumping order on steel fasteners were shipping their product through Malaysia. As of
2010, Malaysia exported only $12 million in steel fasteners to the EU, 1 percent of the
extra-EU import market by value (2 percent by volume) – though this had increased from
less than 0.5 percent just two years earlier. In July 2011, the EU extended the antidumping
measures imposed on China to at least eleven firms in Malaysia (European Union, 2010,
2011).

2.2

China’s import market for steel fasteners

While the EU’s antidumping case and China’s associated WTO challenge were limited to the
facts at issue in the EU antidumping case, any discussion of the political-economic
background to the dispute would be incomplete if it did not also inform on the related
Chinese antidumping investigation and measures imposed on imports from the EU. This is
appropriate given the timing of two cases that covered potentially quite similar products
and possibly affecting an overlapping set of firms that compete in both markets.

Less than one month before the final decision in the EU’s antidumping investigation, China
announced it was initiating an antidumping investigation of its own over certain steel
fastener imports from the EU. The antidumping investigation was initiated in December
2008; China imposed provisional antidumping duties in December 2009. In May of 2010,
the WTO received a formal DSU request for consultations from the EU regarding the
provisional antidumping duties that China had applied. In June 2010, China applied final
measures.

7

Table 1 also summarizes key features of China’s steel fasteners import market and import
policies. China’s applied MFN tariff on the steel fasteners under its antidumping
investigation was either 8.0 or 10.0 percent, depending on the specific product variety
named in the investigation. For each named variety, however, China’s applied MFN tariff
was identical to its WTO binding; thus, like the EU, it also had no scope to raise applied
MFN tariffs. The domestic petitioner in China’s steel fasteners antidumping investigation
was China's Industrial Association of Mechanical General Parts, the exact set of domestic
firms behind the petition is unknown. There was only one European firm named in the
antidumping investigation – KAMAX-Werke Rudolf Kellermann GMBH & Co. KG – and China
imposed a 6.1 percent antidumping duty on its exports. The European firm KAMAX was
headquartered in Belgium and provided steel fasteners primarily for the auto industry.
KAMAX had other subsidiaries across the EU, United States and Japan, in 2010 it
established a trading company in China, and subsequent to China’s antidumping decision in
2012 it announced it had begun construction of its first production plant in China (KAMAX,
2012a,b). For all other European exporters, China applied an all other firm rate of 26
percent.

Figure 2a illustrates that China’s import market for the steel fasteners product ultimately
subject to its antidumping measures was $1.4 billion in 2008, also having doubled from its
2005 level.6 Steel fastener imports from the EU had nearly tripled during this period, from
$124 million to $349 million. Figure 2b illustrates the EU’s share of China’s import market
for these products had risen to 19 percent by 2008, accelerating to 27 percent by 2010 at
the time of the imposition of the final antidumping measure, when it was expected to begin
This figure is also derived from publicly available data. However, unlike the EU data which derives from
Eurostat, the Chinese import data is not at the tariff line level but instead the 6-digit HS level from WITS.
Nevertheless, according to the available data from China’s tariff line tariff codes, the 8-digit tariff-line codes
listed in its antidumping investigation cover all of the sub-products within the more aggregated 6-digit HS
product codes, suggesting in this instance that the 6-digit HS data series is identical to summing up the 8-digit
HS data.
6
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to decline.

The other major foreign suppliers to China’s market for these particular

products are Japan, Taiwan, China; South Korea, and the United States. Like the EU, Japan’s
share of the China import market for these products had also increased considerably
during this time period – increasing by nearly 10 percentage points (from 30 percent to 39
percent) between 2006 and 2010. In volume terms, Figure 2b shows the growth in
Japanese and EU share of China’s import market during this time period is largely coming
at the expense of Taiwan, China, and to a lesser extent from the United States and South
Korea.

While not shown in the figures, it is also worth noting that the Great Recession did not
result in a substantial, long-run impact on China’s total imports of these products, unlike
the case for the European Union described earlier. China’s overall imports of steel fasteners
by 2010 were nearly 33 percent higher than their 2007 levels by value and nearly 40
percent higher by volume.

2.3

Differentiating between the EU and China certain steel fastener markets

While both the EU and China’s antidumping cases referred to certain steel fasteners, to
what extent are these similar or even substitutable products? The simple fact that there
was substantial two-way trade in steel fasteners across long geographic distance suggests
that these products are likely to be somewhat differentiated. 7

Next, it turns out that one half of the 8-digit product lines in the relevant HS-06 product categories for the
EU were left out of the antidumping investigation. The following HS08 lines were included in the EU’s
antidumping petition: 73181290, 73181491, 73181499, 73181559, 73181569, 73181581, 73181589,
73181590, 73182100, and 73182200. The HS08 lines within the same HS06 product categories that were left
out of the petition were 73181210, 73181410, 73181510, 73181520, 73181530, 73181541, 73181549,
73181551, 73181561, and 73181570. As noted above, this is different from China’s antidumping case in
7
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One possibility is that these products are differentiated along the dimension of complexity
or product quality (Schott, 2008), what has come to be known in economics as occupying
different places on the “quality ladder” (Khandelwal, 2010). Figure 3 provides a first pass
at this question by examining the unit values for the certain steel fastener import products
across different foreign source countries. Figure 3a illustrates the EU’s unit value for
imports across four different foreign sources of the 8-digit HS products named in its
antidumping investigation (see again Figure 1) – the United States, China, and Taiwan,
China, and India. Begin with the EU’s imports from the United States. Clearly there is a
substantial distinction between the EU’s imports from the US and the EU’s imports from
China and Taiwan regarding otherwise identical HS08 product lines. Before the onset of the
global trade collapse of 2008-9, unit values on imports from the United States averaged
between $21,000 and $28,000 per tonne each year.8 During this same period, unit values
on imports from China and Taiwan, China averaged only $1,000 to $3,000 per tonne –
suggesting a substantially differentiated product compared to imports from the United
States. The United States had a very small share of the EU’s import market (see again
Figure 1b); together, these facts suggest that the United States may be supplying European
customers with a more highly specialized product and the Chinese and Taiwanese firms
may be supplying a relatively more homogeneous variety likely produced at high scale and
low cost.9

which all of the 8-digit tariff lines within the HS06 product categories were part of the antidumping
investigation.
Unit values on imports from the United States dropped dramatically during the Great Recession, even as the
quantity of imports from the US nearly doubled between 2008 and 2009.
8

Figure 3a also illustrates the unit values on EU imports from India. These unit values – ranging between
$2,000 and $6,000 per tonne – were consistently higher than the unit values on imports from China and
Taiwan, China – though they were much lower than the unit values on imports from the US. Even though
imports from India of this product were negligible during this period (less than $3 million in 2006), this point
is interesting given that India was chosen as the analogue country for China in the normal value calculation.
9
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Next consider the Chinese import market in Figure 3b. As a benchmark, begin again with
the unit values of China’s imports from the United States during this period, which ranged
from $14,000 to $22,000 per tonne per year. The fact that these were not as high as the US
import unit values in the EU market suggests some level difference in demand for the
certain steel fasteners between the EU and China markets. Next, the unit value on Chinese
imports of steel fasteners from the EU averaged $9,000 to $13,000 per tonne during 20022010. While this was not as high as China’s average unit value on steel fastener imports
from the US, it is much higher than the unit value of EU imports of steel fasteners from
China in its antidumping case illustrated in Figure 3a. The difference is more stark after
accounting for the overall difference in price levels, e.g., by comparing unit values of
imports from the US across the two markets. Thus, using the US import values as a
benchmark, a comparison of the import unit values from the products covered by the
reciprocal antidumping cases is consistent with a model of China exporting relatively lowend varieties of steel fasteners to the EU market and the EU exporting relatively high-end
varieties of steel fasteners to the Chinese market.

Finally, preliminary indicators point to two potentially quite different economic outcomes
resulting from the EU and Chinese antidumping cases. While overall EU imports have
dropped, a second result from the European imposition of antidumping on imports of steel
fasteners from China is likely to be substantial trade diversion. The preliminary evidence
(see again Figure 1a) is an increase in EU imports from non-targeted exporters such as
Taiwan, China that were historical suppliers producing a similarly priced variety of steel
fastener imports. Ultimately, this antidumping case results in a relocation of production
from China to Taiwan, China and not necessarily the relocation of substantial production
back to the EU. On the other hand, provided KAMAX follows through with the announced
production facility in China, China’s antidumping duties on imports from the EU of highend steel fasteners could result in “tariff-jumping” foreign direct investment (Blonigen,
2002) – i.e., a relocation of production from the EU to China.
11

3

The Issues before the AB

The AB faced a number of issues from both parties to the dispute10 that could, for all
practical purposes, be classified as follows:

(a) China’s NME status;
(b) The understanding of the term ‘major proportion’;
(c) The possibility to sample producers in the injury-analysis as well (and not only
when defining dumping margins);
(d) The attitude of the EU investigating authority (IA) with respect to the ‘parallelism’
of the subject-matter between the requested information and the basis for the EU
decision to impose AD duties;
(e) The treatment of confidential information by the EU.

Claims under heading (a) were, in principle, of transitional value as far as China is
concerned since, by virtue of the explicit wording of Art. 15 of China’s Protocol of
Accession, China cannot be treated as an NME after 2016, that is, fifteen years after its
succession to the WTO. And yet, in our view, they carry particular weight: the AB response
is one of the scarce attempts to shed some light on the NME-carve out, an issue that for
various reasons had not been comprehensively discussed before this report was issued; the
findings here are of relevance to all WTO Members that are considered NMEs. Moreover, as
we will try to demonstrate infra, the findings of the AB in this respect could be viewed as
the basis for treating imports from China differently from those originating in market
economies beyond 2016 as well. We will address this discussion below.
10Zang

(2011) offers a discussion of the dispute with respect to the claims regarding the NME-status of China.
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4

The AB Findings

4.1

Individual Treatment (China’s Non Market Economy Status)

We described briefly above the MET- and IT tests that appear in Arts. 9(5) and 2.7(a)-(c) of
the EU Regulation. Recall that successful invocation of MET-status confers automatically IT,
while a failed attempt is not necessarily prejudicial since interested exporters can still
request IT; they can also by-pass the MET-process and request simply IT. Two questions
form the heart of the dispute between China and the EU in this context: first, under what
conditions can an IA deviate from its obligations to calculate individual dumping margins?
Second, who should carry the burden of proof to demonstrate that an exporter should be
considered originating in an NME?

With respect to the first question, the AB entertained the claim by the EU to the effect that
the Panel got it wrong when it held that under Art. 6.10 AD sampling is the only exception
to the obligation to calculate individual dumping margins.11 The AB, upholding the Panel’s
findings in this respect, found that the default obligation for WTO Members is to calculate
individual dumping margins, the possibility to impose duties on country-wide basis being
reserved only to the cases referred to in the AD Agreement and not to any other case (§320,
and 329). In rejected a number of scenarios offered by the EU where country-wide duties
were in order since, in the AB’s view, they were all provided for in the AD Agreement and
11Sampling

can lawfully take place when a statistically valid sample has been chosen or when it is impractical
for the IA to calculate individual dumping margins say because of the large number of exporters involved.
Although the two methods, normatively at least, should not be regarded as equivalent (in the name of
impracticality a statistically invalid sample –that is a sample of producers that does not reproduce the
properties of the whole- might be chosen and thus the investigation might suffer from sample bias), they are
recognized as such in Art. 6.10 AD. One of the (many) paradoxes of AD is that while dumping is acknowledged
to be private business practice, still orders can be applied on country-wide basis without meaningful
investigation as to whether the law of one price holds, see on this score the analysis in Mavroidis and Sapir
(2008).
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none of them provided justification for the EU practices to impose country-wide duties
when exports originate in NMEs (§§321-327). The AB thus established that the EU was in
violation of its obligations under Art. 6.10 AD when it imposed country-wide duties on
Chinese exporters because they originate in an NME: there is no corresponding exception
to the obligation to calculate individual dumping margins in the AD Agreement.

Next was the question regarding the allocation of the burden (of production) of proof to
show whether an exporter should be considered originating in an NME or not. Strictly
speaking, a finding here was not necessary for the resolution of the dispute: a finding that
individual dumping margins could not be lawfully calculated in this case should signal
‘game, set and match’ for China. The AB nevertheless, facing an appeal to this effect
addressed this issue as well. Recall that according to the EU-system described above, it is
for the exporter to request MET- status (that might lead to IT). Here we care about MET
status only. To understand the discussion regarding the conformity of MET with the AD
Agreement, we need to place this legal institution in its natural context, that is, the NMEcontext.

The AD Agreement does not refer to NMEs at all; they are addressed in Art. VI GATT. The
AB has consistently held that both the AD Agreement and Art. VI GATT are legally relevant
to the regulation of antidumping. It is thus through the case law-door that NMEs entered
into the WTO picture.12 NMEs are defined in the Interpretative Note ad Art. VI GATT as:

a country which has a complete or substantially complete monopoly of its trade and where
all domestic prices are fixed by the state.

12Czako

et al. (2003), and Mavroidis et al. (2008) discuss the relevant case law; Palmeter (1995) and Stewart
and Dwyer (2010) discuss the negotiating history of the AD Agreement.
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The Note allows WTO Members to deviate from the obligations imposed in Art. VI GATT (as
further explicated in the AD Agreement) but does not explain what methodology exactly
they should be following in similar cases:

It is recognized that, in the case of imports from a country which has a complete or
substantially complete monopoly of its trade and where all domestic prices are fixed by the
State, special difficulties may exist in determining price comparability for the purposes of
paragraph 1, and in such cases importing contracting parties may find it necessary to take
into account the possibility that a strict comparison with domestic prices in such a country
may not always be appropriate.

Normally, an IA, in the absence of legislative guidance as to what to do in such cases, will
either use data from third country producers, or construct the NV. In EU-Footwear (China),
the Panel faced a claim by China that, by choosing Brazil as surrogate country for China, the
EU had violated its obligations under the AD Agreement; the Panel discarded it underlining
the wide discretion IAs have when choosing surrogate countries for NMEs (§§7.253ff.).

Not surprisingly, the NME-status of China was an important issue in the Chinese accession
process. The Chinese Accession Protocol starts from the principle that WTO Members have
a choice either to use Chinese prices or costs for the industry (that is, to treat China as any
other market economy country), or to use a methodology based on the general rule that it
is up to the producers under investigation to:

clearly show that market economy conditions prevail in the industry producing the like
product with regard to the manufacture, production and sale of that product. 13

13WTO

Doc. WT/L/432 at §15.

15

If this has been the case, the importing WTO Member is obliged to use Chinese prices: in
other words, if China is able to establish that it is (either as a whole or with regard to a
particular industry) a market economy according to the criteria set forth in the importing
WTO Member’s national law, China (e.g., the Chinese industry in question) must be treated
as a normal market economy/industry. In order to benefit from market economy status,
the criteria conferring it must have existed in the importing WTO Member’s law at the time
of China’s accession in 2001; it is not entirely clear what happens if similar criteria were
not in place at the time of China’s accession, and it is an open question whether WTO
Members finding themselves in this situation are precluded from treating China as an NME.
This will be, if at all, a short-lived situation, since the NME-status of China will expire at the
latest 15 years after accession, that is, by 2016.

In the opposite case, a methodology that is not based on a strict comparison with domestic
prices or costs in China may be used. If this methodology is applied, it has to be notified to
the WTO Antidumping Committee. China’s Accession Protocol does not set forth which
methodology is to be used in cases where the importing WTO Member does not use
Chinese prices and costs; the final report of the Working Party on China’s Accession14
provides some clarification though in this respect: the authority shall normally utilize, to
the extent possible, and where cooperation existed, the prices or costs in one or more
market economy countries that are significant producers of comparable merchandise, and
that are, either at the level of economic development comparable to that of China, or are
otherwise an appropriate source for the prices or costs to be utilized in light of the nature
of the industry under investigation. Those WTO Members that do not have an established
practice in this respect should make best efforts to ensure that their methodology for
determining price comparability is along similar lines. In addition, it provides that due
process rights of Chinese exporters be respected.

14WTO

Doc. WT/ACC/CHN/49 at §151.

16

It is clear from the discussion above that the burden of proof to show that a company
should not be regarded as originating in an NME lies with the Chinese company requesting
this privilege: §15 of the Protocol of Accession says as much. Nevertheless, the burden is
allocated to the Chinese company only with respect to the NV. Nothing in the Protocol of
Accession imposes the burden on Chinese companies to disavow NME-status with respect
to EP. With respect to EP, hence, the allocation of the burden of proof reverts to the original
distribution, that is, it is for the IA to demonstrate NME-status and proceed in the
consequential calculation of dumping margins. §15 of the Protocol of Accession, in other
words, is a limited exception and covers NV only; the EU presumption thus goes against the
letter and the spirit of Arts. 6.10 and 9.2 AD, the two provisions dealing with calculation of
dumping margins (§§363ff. of the AB report, and especially 364, and 366). Since, in the
eyes of the AB, the EU measure ran afoul the WTO ‘as such’, that is irrespective whether it
had been applied to a particular case, it also ran afoul as applied in the instant case (§409).

The consequence of this finding led the AB to two more conclusions: first, since duties had
in its view been illegally calculated, the obligation to not discriminate had been violated as
well, since other exports to the EU market would not suffer from similar treatment (§398);
second, since the duties had been illegally imposed, the EU had ipso facto violated its
obligations under Art. XVI GATT and 18.4 AD (§398).

4.2

Major Proportion of the Industry

The question before the AB in this respect was whether the EU decision to find that 27% of
the EU fasteners producers constituted a major proportion of the domestic industry was
consistent with Arts. 4.1 and 3.1 AD. The latter requires that the determination of injury be
based on ‘positive evidence’ whereas the former obliges WTO Members to examine injury
of the domestic producers as a whole, without nevertheless, providing a specific
quantitative benchmark, say a fixed percentage of the domestic duty the health of which
should be discussed in the context of injury-analysis.
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It is clear from the discussion in the AB report (§§420ff.) that, in the eyes of the AB, the EU
was inspired by Art. 5.4 AD when deciding on the percentage of the domestic industry (the
27%) that validly represents the whole. In the AB’s view this is wrong, since the two
provisions are designed to address different issues: Art. 5.4 AD deals with the percentage of
the domestic industry that must anyway back a petition to (eventually) impose AD duties
and the WTO legislator decided that a 25% threshold was appropriate in order to avoid
flimsy requests;15 Arts. 3.1 and 4.1 AD on the other hand, are integral part of the injury
analysis where the WTO legislator aims at securing that AD duties will be (eventually)
imposed when the industry as a whole has suffered from dumping practices, and not a
small, un-representative percentage thereof. Indeed, the AB itself, without going the full
nine yards and providing a number, did state that the term ‘major proportion’ points to a
‘relatively high proportion’ (•419). The AB however, did not give a number here. Actually it
went as far as to state that a major proportion could be less than 50% on occasion and as
low as 25% in case of fragmented industries (§§415ff.).

Because the EU had inappropriately linked the percentage of the major industry to that in
Art. 5.4 AD, the AB found that it had violated its WTO obligations in this respect (Art. 4.1
AD). Violation of Art. 4.1 AD means ipso facto that Art. 3.1 AD has also been violated since
the major industry has been inappropriately defined and consequently, AD duties were
ultimately imposed in disregard of the requirement to base findings on positive evidence
(§430). Note however that the EU practice has changed and that the link to the standing
requirement is no longer EU practice. Finally, in §460, the AB condoned the EU practice to
provide exporters with a 15 days deadline to make themselves known (in case they do not,
the EU can of course proceed with the remaining exporters).

15It

is far from clear that this threshold decisively helps avoid sample bias since the 25% could, for example,
correspond to the part of the industry that did not modernize, did not invest in new technologies/equipments
etc., and as a result might have contributed itself to its downfall.
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4.3

Do You Like Sampling Too?

This point deserves an introduction. We are not dealing with a new claim here but merely
with an argument16 in support of the claim discussed immediately supra to the effect that
the EU had violated its obligations under Art. 3.1 AD: China argued before the Panel and the
AB that the EU had violated its obligations under this provision also because it had picked
an un-representative sample of domestic producers (a statistically invalid sample) to
conduct its injury analysis; having defined the major proportion to comprise 27% of the
domestic production, the EU picked a number (65% of this sum, that is, 45 producers) and
went ahead with its investigation.

We dedicate a separate heading to this point because of the novelty of the issue we are
confronted with: the AD Agreement allows for sampling when it comes to defining
dumping margins; it is silent on sampling for purposes of establishing injury resulting from
dumping. Statutory silence was not perceived as obstacle by the EU authorities to go ahead
and sample producers in order to perform the injury analysis.

The AB did not find anything wrong with the EU practice in this respect. In its view, the
absence of specific language allowing sampling in injury-analysis is no reason in and of
itself to disallow similar practice (§436); the percentage chosen by the EU does not run
afoul its obligations under the AD Agreement since, in parallel with the sampling-scenario
when defining dumping margins, the EU does not have to pick a statistically valid sample
(it can also pick the sample of producers that can be investigated); finally, the EU has every
right, in accordance with the AB to exclude from its sample producers that have not

16A

claim, as per constant WTO case law, is the identification of a factual situation and the legal provision that
is allegedly violated as a result of its existence. One or more arguments can be raised in support of specific
claims.
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responded within 15 days to its questionnaire, otherwise the whole investigation process
risks being unduly long (§460).

4.4

Surprise, Surprise (You Pay for This, But They Give You That)

The whole investigation was conducted using PCNs (Product Control Numbers). Six
elements made up the PCNs identified by the Commission, the type of fasteners, their
strength/hardness, coating, the presence of chrome on coating, their diameter, and their
length/thickness. The Commission sent questionnaires requesting information on this
specification of the ‘like product’ under investigation to Chinese exporters and to Pooja
Forge, an Indian company that was used as surrogate to define dumping margins by the EU
Commission (since Chinese exports originated in an NME, as noted supra). The
questionnaires even provided for an example of the product under investigation, namely,

Self-tapping screw, case hardening, not coated, diameter 4,2 millimeters, length 13
millimeters.

So much is clear (§§469-470). Pooja Forge nonetheless, had not provided information on
the PCNs requested. The Commission thus, based its estimation on product types defined
by two factors, strength class and the distinction between standard and special fasteners.
The Panel found that the Chinese producers were informed very late in the process about
the quality of the information provided by the Indian company, and the ensuing
discrepancy with the information they had provided themselves (§§461-462). The late
notification had as consequence the impossibility for the Chinese producers to request
adjustments. This fact, in and of itself, sufficed for the AB to find, that the EU had violated
its obligations under Art. 6.4 AD (§505). A violation of Art. 6.4 AD entails ipso facto a
violation of Art. 6.2 AD since the two provisions are related one being specific law to the
other (§506). Due to the Commission’s failure to indicate what information was relevant,
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the Chinese exporters could not exercise their rights under Art. 2.4 AD, the provision
obliging WTO Members to make fair comparison between NV and EP making due
allowances whenever warranted. And here comes the trick: the Panel accepted and the AB
confirmed that because of the discrepancy mentioned so far (because of the Commission’s
attitude), Chinese exporters were not in position to exercise their rights under this
provision (§515). But the Panel found no evidence supporting that there were differences
affecting price comparability and hence did not find against the EU with respect to China’s
claim that Art. 2.4 AD had been violated. Hence, the AB upholding the Panel’s findings in
this respect finds that the EU did not act inconsistently with its obligations under Art. 2.4
AD (§528 but all paragraphs from §519 onwards are relevant to this discussion).

4.5

Private Investigations and Confidential Information

Some EU economic operators had provided confidential information without providing a
non-confidential summary along and, in China’s and the Panel’s view, the EU, by not
insisting that they do so, had violated its obligations under various paragraphs of Art. 6 AD.
The legal regime regarding supply of confidential information is a bit convoluted, and some
explanation, albeit brief, is in order.

According to the AD Agreement, an information is confidential either by its very nature, or
because it has been provided on confidential basis. The Agreement contains an illustrative
list of information that is confidential by its very nature.17 A party that provides similar
information must show good cause why it should be treated as confidential information,
irrespective whether the information provided is by nature confidential or has been
supplied as such.18 Additionally, a non-confidential summary should be provided as well,
17An

Illustrative List helps the parties to a contract and/or the judge to avoid a Type II-error (a false
negative): armed with some specific examples, it will not overlook the application of a law when confronted
with cases reflecting similar factual situations.
18On

past case law regarding the ‘good cause’-requirement, see Mavroidis et al. (2008).
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unless in exceptional circumstances where its supply is not possible (Art. 6.5 AD). The
Chinese claim concerns this last point: the EU producers did not provide a non-confidential
summary and the EU did not insist that they do. As a result, of course, the right of defense
of the Chinese companies was negatively affected since they were deprived of information
probably crucial to their eventual success before the European IA.

Agrati, an EU producer, for example, had provided a non-confidential summary of
information concerning some injury factors, but not for others. For the latter, the following
statement had been included:

The information cannot be summarized without disclosing confidential information which
can cause damage to our company. The information has been provided as limited (§550).

Fontana Luigi, another EU producer, did not supply a non-confidential summary with
regard to distribution systems and price setting. The reason for doing so, was presented in
the following terms:

The information is by nature confidential because its disclosure would be of significant
competitive advantage to a Competitor (§551).

In the AB’s view, none of the information provided met the ‘exceptional circumstance’standard established in Art. 6.5 AD that must be met for the obligation to provide a nonconfidential summary to be waived (§553). Consequently, the AB, upholding the Panel,
found that the EU had violated its obligations under Art. 6.5 AD by accepting the
justification of the two companies as valid reasons to waive their obligation to provide a
non-confidential summary.
22

5

A Critique

From an economics perspective, the existence of the Antidumping Agreement is difficult to
rationalize given the number of ways in which its language regarding impermissible
behavior by firms competing across borders is inconsistent with permissible profitmaximizing behavior by firms competing within one country. Thus, in our analysis, we take
the Antidumping Agreement as given and focus our critique exclusively on the legal and
economics implications of how it is being interpreted and applied in this particular
instance.

The first issue that we address is statistical sampling. If antidumping authorities use
statistical sampling, how it is used can play a critical role influencing the outcome of the
antidumping investigation. In this particular application our analysis focuses on three
different instances in which the sampling issue arose: i) in the selection of Chinese
exporting firms from which the EU gathered information to make its initial MET decision,
ii) in the use of the Indian firm, Pooja Forge, as a analogue which was used to construct
dumping margins for the Chinese exporters who were deemed in an earlier decision to be
from a nonmarket economy, and iii) in the selection of firms in the domestic industry from
which the EU gathered information to makes its injury determination.19

It is worth stepping back and thinking through the likely economic and statistical goals of
the statistical sampling exercise before turning to a critical examination of the EU’s
applications in this instance. Most importantly, there is no guidance from the Antidumping
As one final aside on the non-economic rationale for antidumping noted above, the mere existence of both
so large number of Chinese exporting firms and domestic (EU) producing firms – numbers so large that it was
necessary for the EU to sample rather than survey them all – again highlights the fact that antidumping is not
a policy concerned with identifying and dealing with potential predation. The large number of firms suggests
few entry barriers thus making it extremely unlikely that a sufficient number of EU producers would be
driven out of business so that Chinese exporting firms would be able to coordinate amongst themselves to
then raise prices in a way so as to impose long-run costs on EU consumers due to a lack of market
competition.
19
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Agreement or

the EU’s antidumping provisions to suggest any other goal of the

exercise but simply characterizing “average” behaviour – i.e., that which is typically
represented by the mean or median of the statistical distribution.

Note that it is not necessary for the Antidumping Agreement or the EU’s antidumping
provisions to have remained silent about this issue; i.e., either could have been written so
as to focus antidumping authority’s analysis and attention on something other than
“average” behaviour. For example, one hypothetical possibility would be to explicitly
dictate that the antidumping authority’s analysis should reflect concern not for the average
but for the “highest” performers – e.g., say, the highest decile or quartile of the distribution
– where “highest” might be based on indicators such as profitability, firm size, a ranking
based on the prices of products, etc. Alternatively or in other settings, provisions might
explicitly dictate that the antidumping authority’s analysis should reflect Rawlsian-like
concern for the “lowest” performers in the distribution. The main point is that no
alternative guidance has been put forward on this issue.

5.1

Initial Sampling of Chinese Exporting Firms for MET

The first question is the process by which the EU sampled Chinese exporting firms to
gather information to make its initial market economy test decision. Table 2 summarizes
the results of five key phases of the sampling selection procedure and responses that
resulted in the sample of Chinese firms whose data the EU ultimately examined to make the
MET determination. Step 1 is the initiation of the investigation and thus begins with the
universe of Chinese exporting firms which produce 100 percent of total fastener exports to
the EU, by definition. In Step 2, the EU sent out a general request to Chinese exporters
asking to make themselves known; 120 firms came forward as a result. In Step 3, the EU
determined that of the 120 firms that revealed themselves as exporting fasteners to the EU,
110 firms were actual exporters, and these firms represented 64 percent of total Chinese
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fastener exports to the EU. In Step 4, the EU decided to select 9 of the 110 firms to provide
the detailed data necessary to make the MET determination, and these firms represented
39 percent of the universe of Chinese export sales to the EU. In Step 5, the EU threw out the
data of 4 of the 9 firms as being unreliable. The remaining 5 Chinese firms on which the EU
based the MET determination combined to represent slightly less than 35 percent of the
universe of Chinese export sales to the EU.

Is it likely that this sample represented “average” characteristics of the Chinese exports? In
order to address this question, even when focusing on “average” behaviour, it is important
to understand whether the MET should be based on the sampling statistic related to the
behaviour of the average “exporter” (firm) or the behaviour of the firm producing the
average “product.” These two are likely to be quite different. As we will see below, the EU’s
sampling procedure and the selection issues that arise make the second outcome much
more likely than the first.

If the goal of the sampling exercise is to capture the behaviour of the average Chinese firm
that exports this product to the EU, it is potentially problematic for the EU to make its
decision about the market economy status of more than 110 firms based on information
collected from these particular five firms. These five Chinese firms were not drawn from a
random sample; i.e., they are the result of a multi-stage process that could result in sample
selection bias stemming from two distinct influences. On one hand, the Chinese firms that
decided to cooperate at Steps 2 and 5 in the investigation may be quite different from the
other, non-sampled Chinese firms that did not choose to cooperate. In other words, the
Chinese firms’ selection of themselves into or out of the sample could be influenced by
strategic considerations such as whether the truthful information that they would provide
would be harmful or helpful to the outcome that is in their best interest overall.20
For example, a Chinese exporting firm that is part of a multinational enterprise with production facilities in
other countries (that they could reallocate production outside of China) could potentially (and perversely)
20
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Furthermore, among the pool of reporting firms, the EU did not randomly sample but
instead selected some of largest exporters. There is an extensive economic research
literature providing evidence that exporting firms are “different”– i.e., more productive
with presumably lower costs for a given level of quality – than other firms (Bernard et al,
forthcoming). It could well follow that larger exporters are then systemically different from
smaller exporters along similar dimensions and thus making a set of observations that had
over-sampled from one segment of the statistical distribution particularly biased. The
implications is that the EU approach may be closer to capturing the behavior of the Chinese
firm producing the average product being exported to the EU, it is less likely that this
sampling procedure is likely to best capture the behavior of the average Chinese firm that
is exporting.

To what extent does a potentially biased sample matter for this particular case?
Interestingly, if the key determinant regarding whether Chinese firms receive market
economy treatment is not firm-specific then the difficulty of how to deal with these sample
selection issues could be moot. For example, suppose the technology to make fasteners is
relatively common across all Chinese firms and that most of a firm’s costs is simply the cost
of the steel wire rod input. Furthermore, assume that the price of steel wire rod is not
determined by the market (as the EU alleged in the investigation) and finally that access to
the subsidized input did not vary across firms.21 Because the impact of the subsidized input
is common across all Chinese firms that produce and export fasteners, there is no statistical
issue of sample selection potentially misinforming the EU’s binary choice for whether the

prefer an outcome in which the EU imposes antidumping duties on all Chinese firms, especially if its main
competitors in the EU market are other Chinese firms without production facilities abroad (e.g., Blonigen and
Ohno, 1998). Such a firm would presumably make its decision of whether to report at all based on whichever
choice led to the greater likelihood of the EU imposing antidumping duties.
Note that it does not necessarily follow that if the steel wire rod input is subsidized then there must be
common access to the subsidized input across firms. For example, such heterogeneity of access could arise
across firms if government subsidy or tax rebate programs were based on firm characteristics such as size (or
access to policymakers), or if their availability differed geographically across regions.
21
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entire set of firms operate in a market economy. This is one alternative way to interpret
how the EU proceeded.

From an economics perspective, the relevance of the statistical sampling issue for the MET
determination confronting the Panel and the AB in this case rests on the validity of the EU
allegation that the key input of steel wire rod does not have a price that is determined by
the market and that this is enjoyed equally by all Chinese fastener exporting firms. Put
differently, the sampling issue is moot if this allegation is correct and if the impact of the
non-market price for that input is common across all Chinese exporting firms. I.e.,
regardless of whether the EU samples only (any) one firm, collects information from the
whole universe of firms, or chooses any option in between, it will always obtain the same
result in the MET. Thus the issue of sampling in this case only becomes relevant if it is
incorrect that steel wire rod is a subsidized input that commonly distorts the costs (and
output pricing decisions) across all Chinese steel fastener exporting firms.

5.2

“Sampling” One Indian Analogue Firm to Construct Normal Values

Given that the Chinese firms did not pass the MET, a second statistical sampling issue arises
regarding the analogue firms from which the EU constructs the normal value in the
dumping margin calculation. In this instance, the EU chose India as the analogue country
and it requested information from two Indian firms, only one of which provided the
information. There are at least two sampling issues that arise in this particular case: the
choice of country and the sampling of firms.

First, we have insufficient information to assess the choice of India as an analogue country.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting from our examination of the publicly available trade data
that India had both an extremely small share of the EU import market (relative to China
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and Taiwan, China – the latter a potential alternative choice for the analogue country) and
India had relatively higher unit values than EU imports from both China and Taiwan, China
(see again Figure 3a). To the extent that higher unit values in the EU import market
correspond to higher costs and higher prices for domestic sales at home, this would make
India an attractive candidate for an analogue country.

The second issue results from the fact that the EU chose to request information from only
two Indian firms and only one of which, Pooja Forge, provided information that the EU
deemed adequate to use to construct the normal value for all of the Chinese firms in the
dumping margin calculation. From a statistical perspective, the result of this process is that
the information of only one Indian firm is used to construct the normal value for more than
110 Chinese exporting firms. For statistical reasons alone, it is highly remote that this one
Indian firm represents the average Chinese exporting “firm” (or even the Chinese firm
producing the average exported “product”) from the universe of Chinese exporting firms
ultimately confronted with the antidumping duty.

5.3

Sample of EU Producers of Fasteners for Injury Test

A third area of the EU investigation in which the issue of statistical sampling arose is with
respect to the injury test for EU producers of the like product. Table 3 illustrates the four
step process by which the EU arrived at the sample of domestic firms by which it collected
information so as to determine whether the domestic industry was injured.

Step 1 is the initiation of the investigation and thus begins with the universe of domestic EU
firms (producing 100 percent of EU total fastener sales, by definition), which the EU
reported as “estimated at over 300 mostly small and medium-sized enterprises but
including a few larger companies” (EU, 2009, (112)). In Step 2, the EU sent out a general
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request that EU producers make themselves known; the result was 46 firms came forward,
which the EU reported as representing 30 percent of domestic production. In Step 3, the EU
selected 7 of the 46 firms (based on volume) to provide the detailed data necessary to
make the injury test determination; these firms represent an unknown share of the
universe of EU production. In Step 4, the EU throws out the data of one of the 7 firms; of the
remaining 6 EU firms on which the injury test determination is based, the EU reported that
they combined to represent 27 percent of the universe of EU production volume of
fasteners.

A number of the same sampling issues already described above in the context of sampled
Chinese exporting firms also arise in the context of EU producers. It is extremely unlikely
that these six EU firms represent the average of the universe of EU steel fastener producers
given that they are the result of a multi-stage process, the likely result is sample selection
bias stemming from two main influences. Again, given that response to EU requests for
information is not compulsory, EU firms may base on strategic considerations their
decision regarding whether to select into the sample by positively responding to the
request for information. Second, the sample is also not random due to the fact that the EU
used the size of the firm (volume of production) as a selection criterion, conditional on the
set of firms that voluntarily responded. Indeed, the EU estimated domestic production to be
comprised of more than 300 producers of steel fasteners, and most were small and
medium-sized enterprises and not the large volume firms that were ultimately part of the
sample under analysis. While this decision rule ensures that maximal EU production is
covered by the injury investigation, it does not follow that the EU is examining whether the
average steel fastener-producing firm suffered injury. By selecting based on production
volume, it is much more likely that the EU is capturing the behaviour of the firm that
produces the average “product” competing with the imported Chinese fasteners and not
the average “firm.”
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5.4 First, a window, then a door: moving away from the obligation to calculate
individual dumping margins

The AB found that the EU practice to calculate a general (as opposed to individual) rate for
Chinese companies because they were considered to belong to an NME was at variance
with the EU obligations under the AD Agreement. It did, however, add a passage which
allows an IA to deviate from its obligation to calculate individual margins even in cases
other than sampling.

The AB report however, added in §§376ff. a passage which offers some additional (to those
contemplated by Art. 6.10 AD) possibilities to investigating authorities. A small detour to
prior case law is necessary: in Korea-Certain Paper,22 the AB had held that an IA can
legitimately calculate the same margin for a group of companies that together constitute
one economic entity, a ‘single entity’ being the term it had explicitly used; what exactly this
term refers to was not made crystal clear in that report, but in all likelihood a ‘control’-type
of criterion seemed appropriate. In EC-Fasteners, the AB went one step further and in §376
it explained how it understood the term:

To be sure, the AD Agreement does not explicitly deal with the situation where different off shoots belong
to the same economic entity and whether one margin or more (of AD duties) should be calculated in similar
cases. This was a total invention of the AB. In theory, the invention is a good one if the entity adopts the same
pricing policy, but only under this very strict condition, In theory also, it could very well be the case that off
shoots of the same company (say Chrysler, Germany and Chrysler, UK) adopt divergent pricing policies when
exporting to Japan; it would be erroneous in similar cases (and indeed, it would defeat the very purpose of
the AD Agreement) to calculate one dumping margin for the two Chrysler companies simply because they
belong to the same group even though they have adopted divergent pricing policies. The AB did not
adequately explain itself on this score. It seems that thus, that the original sin was committed already in
Korea-Certain Paper. As we will demonstrate in what follows here, in EC-Fasteners, the AB went down the
sinful road a couple of miles.
22
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These situations may include: (i) the existence of corporate and structural links between
the exporters, such as common control, shareholding and management; (ii) the existence of
corporate and structural links between the State and the exporters, such as common
control, shareholding and management; and (iii) control or material influence by the State
in respect of pricing and output.

And later, when discussing the criteria for state control it noted (§381):

… evidence of State control or instruction of, or material influence on, the behaviour of
certain exporters in respect of pricing and output. These criteria could show that in the
absence of formal structural links between the State and specific exporters, the State in fact
determines and materially influences prices and output.

Now what exactly should we make of all that? The AB on the one hand cites Korea-Certain
Paper but on the other provides a ‘wide’ understanding of the term ‘single entity’. One
cannot thus, exclude that, upon demonstration of ‘influence’ by the State (which does not
have to be equated to control as the term ‘or’ used in the quoted paragraph unambiguously
suggests) or ‘behaviour’ by companies (a very loose term and hence, in principle an easy to
meet evidentiary standard) IAs could well impose country-wide dumping margins against
Chinese companies in the future as well. The AB closed the door to the possibility for
similar calculations for NMEs but opened a huge window through its understanding of
‘single entity’. At this stage, the AB paragraphs quoted above are mere obiter dicta, e.g.,
they were not decisive for the resolution of the present dispute, and we will thus have to
await their first application in a future dispute in order to draw definitive conclusions.
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Since these paragraphs were obiter dicta with no operational consequences for the
resolution of the dispute, the remaining steps were all downhill for the AB: a violation of
Art. 6.10 AD leads to a violation of Art. 9.2 AD: indeed, how could it be that duties will be
collected in appropriate amounts (as Art. 9.2 AD requires) if, having determined individual
dumping margins the IA imposes country-wide duties (§339)? Arithmetically a similar
endeavor would be correct only in the highly unlikely scenario where all individually
calculated dumping margins are identical. This was evidently not the case here.

5.5 Is “Major Proportion” a major proportion anymore?
Recall that, because the EU had inappropriately linked the percentage of the major industry
in Art. 4.1 AD to that in Art. 5.4 AD, the AB found that it had violated its WTO obligations in
this respect. This much is clear. But the AB did not stop here, although it could have done
so. It went on to provide its own understanding of what constitutes ‘major industry’ and
when doing so the AB stated that this term points to a ‘relatively high proportion’ (•419).
The AB however, did not give a number here. Actually it went as far as to state that a major
proportion could be less than 50% on occasion and as low as 25% in case of fragmented
industries (§§415ff.).

All this is reason enough to be worried as to the manner in which this term will be applied
in the future: how low a percentage is still high enough to meet the threshold of major
proportion? We do not know. And what does the invented term ‘fragmented industries’
amount to? We do not know. Did the AB try to borrow from antitrust theory where, in case
of large number of firms serving 2-4% of the market, a firm with 25% could be held to be in
dominant position? We do not know, but in antitrust analysis barriers to entry in the
market will be a key criterion to determine whether dominance exists, and nothing in the
AB report is reminiscent of this type of analysis.
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Unfortunately, the AB yet again chose to introduce an open-ended term (‘fragmented
industries’) with no statutory underpinnings, the exact parameters of which will be
illuminated only in future practice.

6

Concluding Remarks

The WTO adjudicating bodies are agents with no authority to question the legitimacy of the
law itself. They cannot, for example, put into question whether the discretion allowed to
IAs to choose between a statistically valid sample (which will provide information
regarding the pricing behavior of the average exporting firm), and a number of exporting
firms that can be reasonably investigated (which will more likely instead provide
information regarding the pricing behavior of the firm producing the average product) is
well founded. As a result, our critique of the report cannot focus on shortcomings of the law
itself.

Like other reports in the area of contingent protection, this report evidences the rather
‘liberal’ attitude of the AB when dealing with these issues. For example, the AB could have
stopped when finding that the EU cannot calculate ‘all others rate’ to products originating
in an NME. There was little need to discuss the possibility to do so if there is a particular
relationship between the state and its ‘national’ companies. And yet it did, as it had done
before in Korea-Certain Paper. By the same token, it could have stopped its analysis when
finding that the threshold established in Art. 5.4 AD cannot be used ‘lock, stock, and barrel’
in the context of analysis under Art. 4.1 AD. And yet it did not and moved on to provide its
understanding of how this term should be understood using ‘plastic’ terms that we have no
idea how they will be molded in the future. In the past, the AB has evidenced a similar
attitude when dealing with challenges in the context of sunset reviews.
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Surprisingly, it is the AB, a body often accused for being overtly textualist when
interpreting WTO law that has recourse to similar interpretative attitudes. Furthermore,
this type of judicial activism has thus far managed to escape the attention of critics.
Nevertheless, its consequences could be spectacular: the AB in future case law could hold
that Chinese, Vietnamese etc. companies have particular links with the state and hence,
there is no obligation for an IA to calculate individual margins. Instead, IAs could stop at
determining national rates; the risk for abuses here should not be under-estimated. In this
respect, the AB may be over-confident if it believes that it can ‘tame’ exuberant IAs in the
future: for one, the AB is no trier of facts, and the question of links between companies and
the state is an eminently factual issue. This point alone should give pause to the AB in this
area in future practice.
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Table 1: EU and China Steel Fasteners Import Markets Associated with Antidumping Cases
European Union

China

Tariff binding levels
for named products

3.7%

8.0%-10.0%

Applied MFN tariffs for
named products

3.7%

8.0%-10.0%

Total imports of
named products, 2008

$2.1 billion

$1.4 billion

Domestic firms



European Industrial Fasteners
Institute (EIFI)



China's Industrial Association
of Mechanical General Parts

Foreign firms
(antidumping duty)



Biao Wu Tensile Fasteners Co. Ltd
(69.9%)
Celo Suzhou Precision Fasteners Co.
Ltd (0.0%)
Changshu City Standard Parts
Factory and Changshu British
Shanghai International Fastener Co.
Ltd (63.1%)
Golden Horse (Dong Guan) Metal
Manufactory Co. Ltd (26.5%)
Kunshan Chenghe Standard
Components Co. Ltd (79.5%)
Ningbo Jinding Fastener Co. Ltd
(64.4%)
Ningbo Yonghong Fasteners Co. Ltd
(78.3%)
Yantai Agrati Fasteners Co. Ltd
(0.0%)



KAMAX-Werke Rudolf
Kellermann GMBH & Co. KG
(6.1%)



All Other Companies (26.0%)












Cooperating Exporting Producers
(77.5%)
All Other Companies (85.0%)

Source: compiled by the authors from Bown (2012), WITS and Eurostat.
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Table 2. Results of EU Sampling Procedure of Chinese Exporting Firms for the Market
Economy Test
Remaining number
of exporting firms
in the sample at
completion of phase

Phase of EU investigation

1. Initiation of EU investigation

NA

Share of total China
exports of steel
fasteners to EU

1.00

(though inferred as
greater than 110)

2. EU sends out request for exporters to make
themselves known within 15 days

120

NA

3. EU eliminates from sample of 120 firms 10 firms
that it finds do not produce fasteners or that are
firms that export for others

110

0.64*

4. EU selects from 110 cooperating firms those to
survey that had the largest representative value
of exports

9

0.39

5. Of the 9 firms chosen to survey, the EU decides
that 4 firms refused to cooperate and eliminates
them from sample

5

0.35**

Source: Authors’ tabulation from data provided in EU (2009). NA=not available. *Calculated as equal to
0.39/0.61; i.e., = (9’s exports as a share of total exports from PRC)/(9’s exports as a share of 110
cooperating firms). **Calculated as equal to 0.54/(1/0.64); i.e., = (5’s exports as a share of 110
cooperating firms)/(1/110 firm’s share of exports in total PRC exports).
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Table 3. Results of EU Sampling Procedure of Community Producers of Fasteners for Injury
Test

Phase of EU investigation

Remaining number of firms
in the sample at
completion of phase

1. Initiation of EU investigation

NA

Share of total EU
steel fasteners
production

1.00

(though “over 300
mostly small and
medium-sized
enterprises”)

2. EU sends out request for firms to make
themselves known within 15 days

46

0.30

3. EU selects from 46 cooperating firms those to
survey that had the largest production volume

7

NA

4. Of the 7 firms chosen to survey, the EU decides
that 1 firm refused to cooperate and eliminates it
from sample

6

0.27

Source: Authors’ tabulation from data provided in EU (2009). NA=not available.
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Figure 1: EU Import Market for Certain Steel Fasteners, 2002-2010
a. By value and foreign source
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Source: compiled by the authors with data from Bown (2012) and Eurostat.
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Figure 2: China’s Import Market for Certain Steel Fasteners, 2002-2010
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Source: compiled by the authors with data from Bown (2012) and UN Comtrade made available via WITS.
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Figure 3: Import Price Comparison for EU vs China’s Certain Steel Fastener Products in AD
Cases
US $
per tonne
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Source: compiled by the authors with data from Bown (2012), Eurostat, and UN Comtrade made available via
WITS.
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